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Abstract  
It is increasingly recognized that a transition to sustainable finance is crucial to scale up the low-carbon 
investments needed to achieve the global climate targets. A main barrier to portfolios’ 
decarbonization is the lack of conclusive evidence on whether low-carbon investments add value to a 
portfolio, and on whether markets react to climate announcements by rewarding (penalizing) low-
carbon (carbon-intensive) assets. To fill this gap, we develop an empirical analysis of the low-carbon 
and carbon-intensive indices for the EU, US and global stock markets. We test if financial markets are 
pricing the Paris Agreement (PA) by decreasing (increasing) the systematic risk and increasing 
(decreasing) the portfolio weights of low-carbon (carbon-intensive) indices afterwards. We find that 
after the PA the correlation among low-carbon and carbon-intensive indices drops. The overall 
systematic risk for the low-carbon indices decreases consistently, while stock markets’ reaction is mild 
for most of carbon-intensive indices. Moreover, the weight of the low-carbon indices within an 
optimal portfolio tends to increase after the PA. This evidence suggests that stock market investors 
have started to consider low-carbon assets as an appealing investment opportunity after the PA but 
have not penalized yet carbon-intensive assets. 
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On December 12, 2015 the Paris Agreement (PA hereafter) was announced at the UNFCCC COP21 
conference in Paris. The PA is broadly considered as a landmark step for global climate mitigation and 
adaptation action, and as such, it came at surprise for the most. Indeed, for the first time, most UN 
countries agreed on the need to limit global temperature increase “well below 2°C” above pre-
industrial levels (Art 2.1(a)); to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate 
change (Art 2.1(b)), and to commit to "making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low 
Greenhouse Gas emissions and climate-resilient development" (Art 2.1(c)). 
The PA was followed by an unprecedented consensus among scholars, policy makers and financial 
institutions on the importance of aligning finance to sustainability to achieve the global climate and 
sustainability targets (UNEP-FI, 2018; HLEG, 2018). This requires both the scaling up of investments in 
low-carbon production and consumption activities, and the divestment from fossil fuels production 
and carbon-intensive activities (NCE, 2018).  
Nevertheless, financial capital is still largely allocated into economic activities whose profits rely 
directly or indirectly on fossil fuels’ extraction, combustion and use, and that thus do not align to the 
PA targets. The Climate Stress-test by Battiston et al. (2017) showed that financial actors in the EU 
and US are largely exposed to contracts issued by economic activities that could lose value in a 
disorderly transition to a low-carbon economy and become “carbon stranded assets” (Leaton et al., 
2012; Caldecott, 2018; Mercure et al., 2018).  In particular, Battiston et al. (2017) found that insurance 
and pension funds are exposed for 45% circa of their equity portfolio, making climate financial risk 
material. The financial losses associated to stranded assets could be amplified by financial 
interconnectedness, thus introducing a new potential risk for countries’ economic competitiveness 
and financial stability (Gros et al., 2016; Battiston et al., 2017; Roncoroni et al., 2019). In 2015, the 
Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, warned investors about the materiality of climate-
related financial risks, identifying investors’ exposure to climate-related financial risks assets as a 
potential driver of asset prices volatility and financial instability (Carney 2015). Finally, several central 
banks and regulators that joined the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGSF) recommended 
investors to disclose their exposure to climate risks and to mainstream climate risk assessment in their 
portfolios’ management strategies, by running climate stress-test (NGFS, 2019). 
The PA policy announcement, the research results on the materiality of climate-related financial 
risks, and the response from central banks and financial regulators, represent all strong market signals. 
But investors and financial market’s reactions to such signals are still unclear. Indeed, no conclusive 
evidence has been provided so far on whether (and if so, how) stock markets have started to react to 
the PA announcement.  
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In this paper, we contribute to fill this gap by developing a comprehensive empirical analysis of 
the financial performance of most popular low-carbon and carbon-intensive indices in the EU, US and 
global stock markets, before and after the PA, implementing the most used and robust financial 
methods. First, by extending the market model (Sharpe, 1964), we analyze the performance of both 
low-carbon and carbon-intensive stock markets’ indices in terms of systematic risk (beta) before and 
after the PA. Second, we test for the presence of a structural break in the beta after the PA by 
extending the market model to the five-factor model specification proposed by Fama and French 
(2015). Third, by applying Markowitz (1952)’s portfolio optimization, we analyze whether the optimal 
weights of the low-carbon indices have increased after the PA relative to the optimal weights of the 
carbon-intensive indices. 
We focus on equity holdings and indices traded on the EU, US and global stock markets for two 
reasons. First, despite representing a large share of the market, they have not been covered by the 
literature in a comprehensive way. Second, stock markets and equity contracts, given their financial 
characteristics, usually react faster to announcements and shocks than debt securities.  
The results of our analysis are aimed to inform the portfolios’ risk management strategies of 
investors in the transition to sustainable finance, and to support financial supervisors in the 
assessment of financial market’s exposure to and (mis)pricing of climate transition risk that could give 
rise to financial instability. 
A main disclaimer applies. In order to identify “low-carbon” and “carbon-intensive” indices and 
companies, we use the same information set available to investors, who do not dispose yet of a 
standardized and operational classification of green and brown economic activities and assets. We 
collect daily and monthly prices of EU, US and global stock markets indices composed of companies 
whose business is based on renewable energy production and commercialization, and of companies 
whose main business is related to the production and commercialization of fossil fuel and fossil fuel-
based electricity2.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the economic motivation and review of the 
state of the art on stock markets’ reaction to climate announcements, while Section 3 describes the 
methodology. Section 4 presents the data and discusses the results, while Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Motivation and state of the art  
Since the announcement of the PA, the scientific evidence on the materiality of climate-related 
financial risks, and the number of international financial initiatives for disclosing and assessing climate 
 
2 Despite the European Commission has launched in July 2019 a “green taxonomy” that allows to identify 
economic activities contributing to climate mitigation and adaptation objectives, its market implementation 
has still to be enforced. 
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risks in investors’ portfolios has increased. Recently, a group of central bankers in Europe signed an 
“Open letter on climate-related financial risks”3 talking about climate-driven “Minsky Moments”, i.e. 
a sudden collapse of prices of fossil-based assets (Carney, Villeroy de Galhau and Elderson 2019).  
This statement follows a series of climate financial-related announcements. In 2016, a group of 
130 investors signed a letter calling on the G20 to take steps to meet the PA, and several investors 
announced divesting strategies from fossil fuels4 in response to potential losses driven by carbon 
stranded assets. In 2017, the G20’s Financial Stability Board Task Force for Climate-Related Financial 
Disclosure issued its recommendations for climate-related financial risk disclosure in investors’ 
portfolios (TCFD 2017). In 2019, thirty-four central banks and financial regulators of countries 
representing 50% of global emissions and two-thirds of systemically relevant financial institutions who 
are part of the NGSF recommended investors to introduce climate stress-testing to disclose their 
exposures to climate risks (NGFS 2019). In 2018, in its Financial Stability Report, the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority (EIOPA) assessed the climate-related assets exposure 
of the European insurance sector5, by building on the methodology developed in Battiston et al. 
(2017). The same methodology was followed by the European Central Bank (ECB) who assessed Euro-
Area investors’ exposure to economic activities that are considered as “climate policy relevant” in its 
2019 Financial Stability Review6. 
This represents an unprecedented and fast policy response that markets, if rational, should have 
reflected immediately by changes in asset prices and by pricing the “risk of stay brown” and the 
“opportunity to go green”. Thus, we would expect a decrease (increase) in the systematic risk 
exposure (beta) for low-carbon (carbon-intensive) listed companies, meaning that low-carbon 
investments (carbon-intensive) have become more (less) appealing for investors. 
A recent stream of literature has started to analyze market’s pricing of low-carbon investment 
strategies and market’s reaction to climate announcements. However, this literature is still limited 
and has mostly focused on debt contracts (in particular, corporate bonds). Moreover, the results 
published so far are not univocal (see e.g. the case of a green bonds’ premium, Alessi et al., 2019; 
Zerbib 2019; Karpf and Mandel 2018).  
With regard to the pricing of green investment performance in stock market indices, Singh & 
Shrimali (2018) find that the S&P Clean Energy index does not add value to portfolios in the sense that 
this index is not useful in diversifying the portfolio. However, the time window and the methodology 
 
3 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2019/april/open-letter-on-climate-related-financial-risks 
4 See e.g. Axa in 2017 http://www.climateaction.org/news/axa-investment-managers-pledge-193-million-
divestment 
5 https://eiopa.europa.eu/Pages/EIOPA--Financial-Stability-Report---December-2018.aspx 
6 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-stability/fsr/special/html/ecb.fsrart201905_1~47cf778cc1.en.html 
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used, i.e. a static mean-variance optimization over 10 years returns, do not allow for short-term price 
volatility effects on the market and do not take into account the possible impact of the recent climate-
related announcement as the PA. Lee et al. (2015) use a market model to assess whether firms 
engaging in voluntary carbon disclosure experience abnormal returns in asset prices. Using a sample 
of firms from the Climate Disclosure Project (CDP) Korea 2008 and 2009, they find that the market is 
likely to respond negatively to firms' voluntary carbon disclosure, implying that investors tend to 
perceive carbon disclosure as bad news.  
When it comes to market’s reaction to climate announcements, Ramelli et al. (2018) show that 
investors reacted to two main policy “shocks” in 2016, i.e. Trump’s presidential election and the 
nomination of Scott Pruitt (a climate skeptic) to head the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), by 
rewarding companies in high-emissions industries, at least in the short run.  In contrast, for the same 
policy events, Wagner et al. (2018) find that investors rewarded companies demonstrating more 
responsible climate strategies. Sterner and Mukanjari (2018) studied the stock market’s reaction to 
the announcement of the PA and the election of Donald Trump as a President of the USA, expecting 
to find a different effect on the financial performance of fossil energy firms. They did not find unique 
evidence of stock prices’ response to the announcement of the PA or Trump election on fossil-based 
energy companies. 
From an economic point of view, the possibility of mispricing weakens the assumption of complete 
markets on which traditional financial pricing models stand (e.g. Black and Scholes 1973, Merton 
1974). In presence of asymmetric information (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986) and incomplete markets, 
investors cannot compute their risk-adjusted returns under scenarios associated to certain 
probabilities of occurrence, and multiple equilibria become a possible outcome. In this case, investors 
cannot identify ex-ante a preferred investment strategy. Mispricing of climate-related financial risks 
can slow down the low-carbon transition by limiting firms’ green financing opportunities on the credit 
and debt market. This, in turn, contributes to keep (or even increase) investors’ exposure to and 
trading of carbon-intensive assets, and to dismiss potential opportunities for returns in low-carbon 
sectors. Mispricing of climate risks in the value of financial contracts and investors’ portfolios can lead 
to price volatility if large asset classes are involved, with implications on financial stability 
(Monasterolo et al. 2017).  
Since financial investors take decisions based on what they can measure, and their decisions do 
influence (and are influenced by) the benchmark in their respective markets, robust portfolio’s 
analyses of the conditions under which low-carbon investments could provide systematically higher 
risk-adjusted returns than carbon-intensive investments are urgently needed.  
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3. Methodology 
We analyze financial market’s reaction to, and pricing of, the announcement of the PA by applying 
robust financial econometric models to a selection of low-carbon and high-carbon indices7.  
We consider the null hypothesis (𝐻") of no change in the value of beta before/after the PA, i.e. no 
impact of the announcement of the PA for both low-carbon and carbon-intensive indices (equity 
contracts), against two alternative hypotheses: 
• 𝐻#$: after the PA, low-carbon indices show lower systematic risk than before the PA;  
• 𝐻#%: after the PA, carbon-intensive indices show higher systematic risk than before the PA. 
We test for the presence of significant differences in systematic risk (beta) across low-carbon and 
carbon-intensive indices to understand if the market is pricing them in a different (and statistically 
significant) way in terms of the systematic risk profile (beta) of the two classes of assets.  
Then, to control for other possible determinants of stocks’ returns in addition to the market factor, 
we test for the presence of a structural break in the index beta after the PA by extending the market 
model to the five-factor model specification proposed by Fama and French (2015). The multi-factor 
approach allows us to find other factors that might explain the risk-return profile of low-carbon and 
carbon-intensive indices, thus strengthening the economic meaning of our analysis. 
Finally, we consider the well-established Markowitz (1952)’s portfolio optimization technique to 
analyze portfolio’s performance before and after the PA, assessing whether the optimal weights in a 
portfolio composed by low-carbon (“green”) and carbon-intensive (“brown”) equity contracts and 
indices change before and after the PA. In particular, we assess whether the “green” component is 
more relevant after the PA than before, i.e., whether it adds value to a portfolio.  
 
3.1 Market model: stock market indices performance and sensitivity to the Paris Agreement 
We consider the following linear model: 𝑟',) = 𝛼' + 𝛽'𝑟.,) + 𝛾'𝑟.,)𝑑) + 𝜀',)      (1) 
where 𝑟',) and 𝑟.,) are the (log-)return at time t of an equity index i and the market index m, 
respectively, 𝑑) is a dummy variable which takes value 1 after the PA and 0 otherwise, and 𝜀',) is an 
i.i.d. error term with 𝐸3𝜀',)4 = 0 and 𝐸3𝜀',)𝑟.,)4 = 0.8 
 
7 See Section 4 for the description of the financial data used. 
8 In our preliminary analyses, we have also allowed for a break in the intercept, i.e. including 𝛿'𝑑) in the 
specification of model (1) (and model (2) below. However, for all of the estimated models, we found 𝛿7' being 
non-significant. Therefore, we have preferred to exclude it from the specification of models (1) and (2) in order 
to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated. 
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The model allows to estimate the impact of climate announcements, and specifically considering 
the announcement of the PA at the UN COP21 conference in Paris (2015/12/12) on indices’ 
performance in the EU, US and global stock markets. 
The model that we propose is akin to the market model within the CAPM framework (Sharpe, 
1964) as it derives the linear relationship between the asset’s expected return and its beta, which is a 
standard measure of the asset’s systematic risk. This means that, similarly to the market model, our 
model identifies the risk-return profile of asset i in a simple and straightforward way. There are several 
well-known statistical limitations of the market model and of the CAPM framework, including the 
assumptions of absence of autocorrelation, of homoskedasticity and Gaussianity, and of 
independence between the market index used as regressor and the stochastic component. 
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the market model is still considered as one of the main 
benchmarks in financial studies for its simplicity and interpretability9.  
In our analysis, we address these potential limitations by: 
• Using Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors to account for 
possible autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and, to some extent, the deviation from the normal 
distribution; 
• Considering highly diversified market indices, i.e. indices composed of numerous stocks, in order 
to weaken the possible correlation between the regressor and the model’s stochastic component.  
 
Further, we extend the standard market model specification by including the interaction variable 𝑟.,)𝑑), which allows to capture the impact of the PA on the level of systematic risk and the risk-return 
profile of the asset. In this regard, a rejection of the null hypothesis 𝐻": 𝛾' = 0 implies that the 
systematic risk of the asset has significantly changed after the PA. More precisely, rejecting the null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternative 𝐻#$: 𝛾' < 0, implies that the asset has reduced its level of 
systematic risk. In contrast, rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative 𝐻#%: 𝛾' > 0 implies 
an increase in the asset’s systematic risk.  
Our approach is in the spirit of the Chow test to assess the presence of a structural break at a 
given date in time (Chow, 1960). In particular, here we focus on the break of the slope parameter, i.e. 
an abrupt change in the level of systematic risk related to the PA announcement.  
 
 
9 In addition, we are well aware of the fact that future climate impacts are characterized by large uncertainty 
and non-linearity, thus implying the need to consider stochasticity. For a discussion of the challenges for pricing 
climate policy risks in financial contracts see Battiston and Monasterolo (2019). 
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3.2 Beyond the market factor: determinants of indices performance and sensitivity to the Paris 
Agreement in a Fama-French five-factor model 
In this section we extend the market model in (1) to the multi-factor approach developed by Fama 
and French (2015). In particular, we consider the following model specification 𝑟',) − 𝑟<,) = 𝛼' + 𝛽'(𝑟.,) − 𝑟<,)) + 𝛾'(𝑟.,) − 𝑟<,))𝑑) +𝜍'𝑆𝑀𝐵) + 𝜉'𝐻𝑀𝐿) + 𝜌'𝑅𝑀𝑊) + Ϛ'𝐶𝑀𝐴) + 𝜀',)                              (2) 
where 𝑟<,) is (the proxy of) the risk-free rate, SMB (Small Minus Big) denotes the size factor, i.e., the 
mean return on the small company stock portfolio minus the mean return on the big company stock 
portfolio, HML (High Minus Low) is the value factor computed as the difference between the mean 
returns on the “value” portfolio and the “growth” portfolio in terms of company’s book-to-market 
value, RMW (Robust Minus Weak) is the profitability factor, that is the mean return on the robust 
operating profitability portfolios minus the mean return on the weak operating profitability portfolios, 
and CMA (Conservative Minus Aggressive) denotes the investment factor, i.e., the difference between 
the mean returns on the conservative and aggressive investment portfolios. More details on these 
factors can be found in the online Kenneth R. French’s data library. As for model (1), 𝜀',) is assumed to 
be an i.i.d. error term uncorrelated with the regressors and with 𝐸3𝜀',)4 = 0 and we test the null 
hypothesis 𝐻": 𝛾' = 0 against the alternatives 𝐻#$: 𝛾' < 0 and 𝐻#%: 𝛾' > 0 to evaluate the abrupt 
change in the asset’s systematic risk after the PA. 
 
3.3 Portfolio optimization: reweighting optimal portfolio in response to the Paris Agreement 
We assess the impact of the PA announcement on the financial performance of low-carbon and 
carbon-intensive investments. We consider the standard Markowitz (1952)’s optimization technique 
based on Lagrange multipliers to construct optimal portfolios that include both low-carbon and 
carbon-intensive indices, recording their value both before and after the PA in order to compare the 
weights for the low-carbon and carbon-intensive components of the portfolios.  
Markowitz’s portfolio optimization is chosen because it is a standard methodology adopted by 
academics and practitioners. It consists in minimizing the weighted variance of the portfolio of n assets 
(in our analysis, the stock market’s indices) for a given level of expected return. More formally, we 
define the optimal weights as the vector 𝑤L	such that argminT𝑤′Σ𝑤 
subject to the following restrictions 𝑅W𝑤 = 𝜇 ∑ 𝑤'Z'[# = 1                (2) 
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using Lagrange multipliers, where w is a n-dimensional vector of portfolio weights, Σ is the covariance 
matrix for the returns on the n indices in the portfolio, 𝑅 is the vector of indices’ returns, and 𝜇 is the 
expected return objective of the portfolio. The restriction in (2) excludes the possibility of investors’ 
short positions on the portfolio. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Data and preliminary analysis 
We select and analyze a sample of the most popular and capitalized equity holding indices from the 
US, EU and global financial markets, including S&P, Stoxx, FTSE and Nasdaq (see Table 1), collected at 
daily and monthly frequencies. This selection allows us to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
financial performance of low-carbon and carbon-intensive equity holdings on EU, US and global 
markets, evaluating and comparing their risk-return profiles.  
Since a standardized classification of “green” or “brown” sectors and firms is not available yet, we 
use the best and same information available to investors. We collect daily and monthly data on 
indices’ prices from Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bloomberg10. With the aim to increase the 
robustness of our results, we consider a set of global, EU and US stock market’s indices as proxies of 
market return, i.e. the regressor 𝑟.,) in model (1). The empirical analysis is developed using the indices 
that are listed in Table 1. Table 1 also shows the results for two well-known and commonly adopted 
reward-to-risk performance indicators, namely the Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966), defined as the ratio 
between the mean return of the index in excess with respect to (the proxy of) the risk-free rate and 
the index’s standard deviation, and the Sortino ratio (Sortino and Van der Meer, 1991), where the 
mean return of the index in excess with respect to (the proxy of) the risk-free rate is divided by the 
downside risk, defined as 𝐷𝑆𝑅 = ^#_ ∑ (𝑀𝑖𝑛(0, 𝑟',) − 𝑟<,)))b_)[#  . The significance of the difference 
between the mean returns and the standard deviations before/after the PA, i.e. the outcome of the 
tests for the null hypotheses of equal means and equal variances respectively, are displayed using 
asterisks (see the ‘After PA’ panel of Table 1, columns ‘Mean’ and ‘Std Dev’).  
We start our analysis from the low-carbon asset class. From the standard deviations reported in 
Table 1, we note that the volatility of all the low-carbon indices has sensibly decreased after the PA 
announcement. For instance, the standard deviation of Renixx has more than halved after the date of 
the PA announcement both at daily and monthly frequencies. On the other hand, we observe that the 
 
10 The selection of these indices was carried out by searching for keywords such as “clean energy”, “renewable”, 
“green energy”, and “ESG environment” to identify low-carbon indices while the carbon-intensive indices were 
selected using the conventional “oil and gas” definition. 
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majority of the low-carbon indices shows an overall increase in the mean returns in the period after 
the PA, in particular in relation to the Nasdaq Clean Edge Green Energy, Wilderhill Clean Energy and 
Renixx indices. However, it is also interesting to note that some low-carbon indices show negative 
daily mean returns both in the whole sample and after the PA (S&P Global Clean Energy and Renixx 
indices) or before PA (Winderhill Clean Energy index). The overall performance of the low-carbon 
indices has increased after the PA, in particular thanks to a reduction in the risk level of their assets.  
Now we consider the carbon-intensive assets class. From Table 1, we notice a strong reduction in 
the standard deviation for carbon-intensive indices as well, when comparing the whole sample period 
and the period after the PA. Also, the carbon-intensive class shows similar mean returns, thus 
suggesting an improvement in their overall financial performance after the end of 2015 (i.e. the time 
of the PA announcement). Finally, the market indices considered in our analysis show performances 
in line with those observed for the low-carbon and carbon-intensive asset classes, i.e. a reduction in 
volatility after the PA and similar mean returns. Thus, Table 1 does not allow to infer univocal 
conclusions on an impact of the PA announcement on the risk-return profiles of these indices.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Figure 1 depicts the sample correlations between the monthly returns of the indices listed in Table 
1 for the entire sample (left panel) and for the period after the PA (right panel of Figure 1). If we 
consider the whole sample (left panel of Figure 1), the correlations between indices are quite large, in 
particular among indices that belong to the same class. However, focusing on the relationship 
between low-carbon and carbon-intensive indices, we observe that the correlations are smaller and 
range between 0.3 and 0.6. After the PA announcement (right panel of Figure 1), the correlations have 
in general decreased, except for those between the carbon-intensive indices class, which shows a 
similar correlation structure than before the PA. Conversely, the correlations between the low-carbon 
and carbon-intensive indices are close to zero, thus suggesting that there is no linear relationship 
between the returns of these two classes of assets after the PA. This result is interesting also from an 
investor’s viewpoint, in so far, uncorrelated asset classes might be particularly useful for portfolio’s 
optimization (as shown in Section 4.3).      
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
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To improve our understanding of the impact (if any) of the PA on the financial performance of the 
low-carbon and carbon-intensive indices considered, we estimate the extended market model (1) and 
the extended Fama-French five-factor model in (2). Within the risk-adjusted framework provided by 
models (1) and (2), we investigate whether the improvement in the risk-return profile after the PA 
obtained for several indices is market-driven or statistically significant, once we have controlled for 
market risk (model (1)) as well as other factors (model (2)), i.e. after comparing and testing the betas 
of the indices before and after PA. 
 
4.2 Market model’s results: stock market’s indices performance and sensitivity to the Paris Agreement 
The results for the estimation of model (1) are reported in Table 2 for daily and monthly data 
frequencies. All regressions are estimated using the MSCI World index as regressor 𝑟.,). Moreveor, 
when a regional (i.e., either US or EU) index is analyzed, we also estimate model (1) with S&P500 ES 
Energy index and Stoxx Europe 600 index as regressor for US and EU, respectively. This allows us to 
control for possible regional effects.  
Table 2 results show that estimated intercepts are not significant for any index. In a CAPM/market 
model framework, this result allows us to avoid considering other factors to explain the linear 
relationship between an asset’s expected return and the return of the market index (or market 
portfolio).  
Let’s now consider the estimated betas. The results in Table 2 show that the level of systematic 
risk (𝛽7') associated to the low-carbon equity indices are, as expected, all significantly different from 
zero and larger than one, except for the Nasdaq Clean Edge Green Energy index (against S&P500 ES 
Energy index as regressor at daily frequency) and the STOXX Global ESG ENV Leaders index at both 
frequencies11. Moreover, according to the robust HAC standard errors, we do not reject the null 
hypothesis that beta is equal to one for Renixx (at daily frequency) and Nasdaq Clean Edge Green 
Energy index (against S&P500 ES Energy index as regressor at monthly frequency), thus suggesting 
that the level of systematic risk for these indices is in line with the one of the market itself, i.e. they 
co-move as the benchmark market index.  
Therefore, except for the cases discussed above, the results in Table 2 show that the low-carbon 
asset class is characterized by a risk-return profile larger than the market in the whole sample. 
However, focusing on the estimates for the dummy interaction variable that measures the impact of 
the PA announcement, we find that the level of systematic risk associated to the low-carbon equity 
indices has significantly decreased after the PA in the US, EU, and globally. In particular, we find a 
 
11 It must be noted that the different behaviour of the Stoxx Global ESG Env Leaders index with respect to the 
other low-carbon indices might be due to its short time series as it exists only from mid 2011 (see Table 1).  
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significant reduction of the systematic risk after the PA for monthly data. The estimates of 𝛾'  in model 
(1) are significantly smaller than zero, and we reject the null hypothesis 𝐻": 𝛾' = 0 in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis 𝐻#$: 𝛾' < 0 for all the low-carbon equity indices analyzed. After the PA, we 
observe that the level of systematic risk, measured as 𝛽7' + 𝛾c', is now strictly less than 1 for S&P Global 
Clean Energy and Renixx indices at daily frequency. This means that overall the low-carbon class has 
sensibly reduced the level of systematic risk, thus representing an appealing investment opportunity.  
Moreover, in the last column of Table 2, we report the results for the HAC robust F statistics to 
test for the null hypothesis 𝐻": 𝛽' + 𝛾' = 1, i.e., we test whether the risk-return profile of the indices 
non-significantly different from the risk-return profile of the market portfolio (or benchmark). The 
results show that we do not reject the null hypothesis for all the low-carbon indices considered, except 
for the STOXX Global ESG ENV Leaders index and Nasdaq Clean Edge Green Energy index (against 
S&P500 ES Energy index as regressor). Interestingly, for the latter we find evidence of non-rejection 
of the null hypothesis 𝐻": 𝛽' + 𝛾' = 0, i.e., the return of the Nasdaq Clean Edge Green Energy index is 
uncorrelated with the return on the S&P500 ES Energy index after the PA (see also Figure 1).  
When considering the carbon-intensive equity indices, the results in Table 2 show that the level 
of systematic risk (𝛽7') is close to and in general not significantly different from one at daily frequency, 
and in general slightly smaller than one at monthly frequency. Conversely to the low-carbon asset 
class, the impact of the PA announcement leads to an increase of the overall systematic risk (rejection 
of 𝐻" in favour of 𝐻#%: 𝛾' > 0) for all the carbon-intensive indices considered. Exceptions are 
represented by the S&P 500 Integrated Oil & Gas and the Stoxx Europe 600 Oil & Gas (against the 
Stoxx Europe 600 index as regressor – but not against the MSCI World) indices, where either we do 
not reject the null 𝐻": 𝛾' = 0 or we even find that the level of systematic risk has declined (𝛾c' < 0) for 
S&P 500 Integrated Oil & Gas index vs S&P500 ES Energy index used as a regressor. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
4.3 Results for the Fama-French five-factor model 
The results for the estimation of model (2) are reported in Table 3. All the data for the factors, as well 
as the proxy for the risk-free rate, are taken from Kenneth French’s data library12 at monthly 
frequency. In line with the results for the market model, the results in Table 3 show that estimated 
intercepts are not significant for any index, at least at 5% significance level, thus suggesting that no 
other factor than the five included in the model specification is required.  
 
12 https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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The results for the estimated beta coefficients are similar to those obtained in Table 2 for all the 
indices at monthly frequency. Then, the estimates for the dummy interaction variable that measures 
the impact of the PA announcement show that the level of systematic risk associated to the low-
carbon equity indices has significantly decreased after the PA in all the stock markets considered, again 
in line with the results for the market model reported in Table 2 and with the only exception of the 
Stoxx Global ESG Env Leaders index (see footnote 11 for a possible explanation). In particular, the 
estimates of 𝛾'  in model (2) are significantly smaller than zero, thus rejecting the null hypothesis 𝐻": 𝛾' = 0 in favour of the alternative hypothesis 𝐻#$: 𝛾' < 0 for all the low-carbon equity indices 
analyzed. After the PA, we observe that the level of systematic risk for monthly data, given by 𝛽7' + 𝛾c', 
is not only strictly less than 1 but also close to zero for all the low-carbon indices. Therefore, overall 
the low-carbon indices have sensibly reduced their level of systematic risk and, interestingly, their 
dynamic behavior is basically uncorrelated with the dynamics of the market after the PA. Indeed, the 
correlations between the returns on the indices and the returns on the market portfolio after the PA 
are small as reported in Figure 1.  
The results in Table 3 also shows the presence of other significant factors, in addition to the market 
factor, that explain the (excess) return dynamics of the indices. In particular, for the Nasdaq Clean 
Edge and Wilderhill indices we find evidence of three additional factors, namely size (SMB), 
profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) factors. The latter is also found significant for the other 
three low-carbon indices considered, even though only at 10% significance level for Stoxx Global ESG 
ENV Leaders index. Moreover, the size factor is also significant for Renixx as well as the profitability 
factor for S&P Global Clean Energy index (at 10% level). All the coefficients for these factors have 
concordant sign. The estimated coefficients for the size factor are positive while those for the 
profitability and investment factors are negative.   
Despite it is difficult to provide an economic interpretation of the results from a factor model 
(Table 3), our results are consistent with the characteristics of the renewable energy companies that 
mostly compose the low-carbon indices and their business models. These companies are usually small 
and with low access to capital markets (and thus small-capitalized). They have higher initial fixed 
capital costs of investments despite then running on a quasi-zero marginal costs, and they face higher 
costs of borrowing from banks in comparison to traditional energy companies. They have overall a 
weak initial operating profitability but when they go on capital markets, they usually have an 
aggressive investment attitude. For a discussion of investment decisions of renewable energy firms, 
including the role of capital costs, immobilized costs, project finance and other non-financial factors 
affecting investments (e.g. policy, governance), see respectively Hall et al. (2017), Hirth and Steckel 
(2016), Steffen (2018), Masini and Menichetti (2013).   
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Conversely, the results in Table 3 show that the profitability factor (RMW) is the only significant 
factor for all the carbon-intensive indices. As opposed to low-carbon indices, the estimated 
coefficients for the RMW factor are positive, thus suggesting that the constituents of carbon-intensive 
indices are positively correlated with firms characterized by robust operating profitability.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
4.4 Results for portfolio optimization: reweighting optimal portfolio in response to the Paris Agreement 
Figure 2 shows the optimal weights in percentage for the low-carbon (in shades of green) and carbon-
intensive (in yellow and brown) indices resulting from the Markowitz’s portfolio optimization 
technique. 
In particular, Figure 2 shows the optimal weights of the portfolio composed by the low-carbon 
and carbon-intensive indices listed in Table 1 before and after the PA for two (monthly) expected 
return objectives, namely 𝜇 = 0.35% (i.e. 4.2% on annual basis) and 𝜇 = 0.5% (i.e. 6% annually). The 
results show that the aggregated weight of the low-carbon component tends to increase after the PA 
announcement relative to the carbon-intensive component that is underweighted within the optimal 
portfolio after the PA. In particular, the cumulated weight for the low-carbon component increases 
from 53.97% (69.04%) before the PA to 87.62% (77.96%) after the PA for 𝜇 = 0.35% (𝜇 = 0.5%). 
Moreover, the resulting portfolio’s (monthly) standard deviations are smaller after the PA than before 
as 𝜎c = √𝑤L′𝛴𝑤L = 3.60% (3.48%) before the PA vs. 𝜎c = 3.01% (3.04%) after the PA for 𝜇 = 0.35% 
(𝜇 = 0.5%). From Figure 2 it also is interesting to observe that the green component in the optimal 
portfolio, at individual level, is constituted only by the Stoxx Global ESG Env Leaders index before the 
PA, while two other indices (Nasdaq Clean Edge Energy and S&P Global Clean Energy13) contribute to 
the low-carbon component in the optimal portfolio after the PA. On the other hand, the carbon-
intensive component is constituted only by the S&P-500 Integrated Oil & Gas index before the PA, in 
addition to the Stoxx Europe 600 Oil & Gas index after the PA. 
The evidence of an increase in the portfolio weights for the low-carbon indices can be partially 
explained by the fact that, after the PA, the correlations among carbon-intensive indices remain high. 
In contrast, the correlations among low-carbon indices, as well as the cross-correlations decrease (see 
Figure 1). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
 
13 Therefore, unlike the findings in Singh & Shrimali (2018), we find evidence that S&P Global Clean Energy 
does add value to a portfolio (but only after the PA announcement). 
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5. Conclusions  
In this paper, we have developed a first comprehensive analysis of the financial performance of most 
used and capitalized low-carbon and carbon-intensive equity indices in the EU, US and global stock 
markets, before and after the PA. With our analysis, we want to assess if and to what extent stock 
markets have priced the PA announcement by rewarding (penalizing) low-carbon (carbon-intensive) 
indices. We have also analyzed whether the announcement of the PA has influenced investors’ 
behavior towards low-carbon and carbon-intensive assets in their portfolio composition. On the one 
hand, this information is crucial to timely inform investors’ portfolio risk management strategies, thus 
creating the conditions for a smooth low-carbon transition. On the other hand, this information can 
support financial supervisors in the identification of the market drivers of assets prices volatility 
related to climate policy shocks and of effective measures to mitigate such risk, thus delivering on 
their mandate of preserving financial stability.  
A remark applies. It is well known that a main barrier to assess the performance of “low-carbon” 
vs “carbon-intensive” investments is represented by the lack of a standardized “green” and “brown” 
taxonomy. Being a classification of assets according to their “shade of green” beyond the scope of our 
analysis, and yet being aware of this limitation, we classify stock markets’ indices into low-carbon and 
carbon-intensive using the most relevant information set available to investors. 
Our results show that before the PA announcement, the low-carbon (carbon-intensive) asset class  
was generally perceived as riskier than (as risky as) the market. In contrast, after the PA 
announcement, in general the risk-return profile of the low-carbon (carbon-intensive) asset class has 
significantly reduced (increased at daily frequency – but less evidence is found for monthly data). In 
particular, we find that: 
- The overall performance of the low-carbon indices has increased after the PA due to a significant 
reduction in the index’s risk level. Moreover, most low-carbon indices considered show an overall 
increase in the mean returns after the PA, albeit non-significantly;  
- The correlations among low-carbon indices decrease after the PA while the correlations between 
carbon-intensive indices remain high. Moreover, the cross-correlations between low and carbon-
intensive indices decrease almost to zero after the PA;  
- The level of systematic risk (beta) associated to the low-carbon equity indices has significantly 
decreased after the PA both in the US and EU, as well as globally; 
- The optimal weights of the low-carbon indices tend to increase after the PA relative to the optimal 
weights of the carbon-intensive indices.  
Therefore, our results suggest that after the PA announcement the market has considered most 
low-carbon indices as less risky and hence more appealing for investment opportunities, but its 
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reaction on the carbon-intensive indices was milder and appreciable only considering daily returns. 
The drivers of this behavior deserve to be properly understood and will be object of future analysis.  
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